A complex, fragmented and heterogeneous network of domestic and international legal instruments promotes and protects foreign investment in Africa. While bilateral treaties seem to be increasingly unpopular, regionalism is clearly on the rise in the continent. The article examines how regional treaties have contributed to upgrade the current regulation of foreign investment. From this perspective, Africa can be seen as a normative laboratory. Regional treaties, most prominently those concluded within the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the Southern African Development Community (SADC), contain several important novelties meant to rebalance the rights and obligations of the various stakeholders as well as to safeguard host State policy space. The content of these treaties has been brought more in line with the evolution of international law, especially with regard to the protection of the environment, social and human rights, transparency, corruption, public scrutiny, economic development, and corporate responsibility.
Introduction
The crucial role that foreign investment may play in promoting economic growth is undisputed,1 especially in Africa. Tellingly, the United Nations (UN) Millennium Declaration contains a unique section on the special needs of Africa -the only continent specifically addressed in the Declaration -in which the role of foreign investment is emphasised.2 Such a role is also recognized in the legislation of several African States, such as the Investment Law of Namibia, which includes amongst the objectives of foreign investment 'the promotion of sustainable economic development and growth through the mobilisation and attraction of foreign and domestic investment to enhance economic development, reduce unemployment, accelerate growth and diversify the economy' .3 Although the spectacular increase of foreign investment within and to Africa anticipated a couple of years ago4 has not materialized yet, due to several reasons including most prominently the still depressed global economic environment and weak commodities prices,5 foreign investments are still expected to offer the continent an unprecedented opportunity to boost its economic development and pursue the objectives indicated in the UN Millennium Declaration. It is therefore crucial for African governments and organizations to develop sound investment policies and to effectively translate them into coherent and coordinated domestic, regional and international legal instruments.
The article discusses the role of African sub-regional organizations have played and continue to play in the promotion and protection of foreign investment. Whereas these organizations have already made important achievements, however heterogeneous, the potential for further developments is remarkable for two main reasons.6 On the one hand, the current network of bilateral investment treaties (BITs) concluded amongst African States, and between African States and third States remains rather underdeveloped, irregular and fragmentary. On the other hand, there is a strong belief that a sub-regionaland in due time a pan-African -approach, coupled with the progressive harmonization of domestic policies, will maximise the positive impact of foreign investment.7
Taking into account the peculiar features of the continent, the article first briefly maps the current framework of investment treaties in the continent (Part 2). It then discusses the shift from trade globalism and investment bilateralism towards regional arrangements that merge both trade and investment regimes. It also explains the intricacies of regionalism across continents, focussing on Africa (Parts 3 and 4). Part 5 considers the rise of regionalism as a third way, alternative to multilateralism and bilateralism, to promote and regulate foreign investment in Africa. The article finally analyses how African regional organisations have responded to the main concerns raised in the last years in relation to foreign investment and the settlement of related disputes, namely the unbalanced character of the rights and obligations contained in investment treaties, the lack of transparency and public scrutiny, and the inadequate safeguards for host State policy space (Part 6).
African States or between them and third States.10 Only 496 of them (or 58.21%), however, are currently in force. The network is clearly underdeveloped as these treaties correspond roughly to 5.54% of the treaty network necessary to cover all bilateral relationships amongst African States and between them and the rest of the world.11 Furthermore, the number of BITs concluded by African countries varies remarkably. Suffice it to mention that the aggregate number of BITs applicable to Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Morocco and Tunisia amounts to 202 (out of 301 signed), or the equivalent of 40.72% of the BITs in force in the entire continent.
In addition to the irregular distribution of BITs in force and the extremely high percentage of unratified BITs, which seems to be a striking peculiarity of BITs concluded by and amongst African States, two more elements emerge from the recent practice. First, BITs are increasingly less popular amongst African States. African States negotiate and conclude BITs at a significantly slower rate compared to the record figures recorded in the 1990s. Indeed, since January 2014 only 27 BITs (including five between African countries) have been signed and only seven of them (including two between African countries) have entered into force. At the same time, several BITs have been terminated or not been renewed. South Africa alone had put an end to thirteen BITs in combination with the adoption of a domestic piece of legislation on the protection of investment.12 Second, BITs concluded by African States with non-African States are increasingly more balanced and sophisticated. The BIT between Japan and Mozambique,13 for instance, contains alongside the common standards on the promotion and protection of foreign investment, provisions on transparency (Article 8), public participation in the adoption, amendment and repeal of related regulations (Article 9), measures against corruption (Article 10), general and security exceptions (Article 18), temporary safeguard measures (Article 19), prudential measures (Article 20), and health, safety and environmental measures and labour standards (Article 24).
BITs concluded between Africa countries, on the contrary, still tend to adhere to the traditional model, which is essentially economic-oriented and often manifestly unbalanced in favour of foreign investors. Some encouraging signs of a more balanced and more inclusive approach can be detected in some recent BITs, such as in ,23 Egypt24  and Tunisia25) , on the contrary, do not contain a specific chapter on investment, but only certain provisions on matters related to investment.
2.2
Multilateral Agreements 2.2.1
Regional Agreements on the Promotion and Protection of Foreign Investment Several African regional organizations have concluded agreements or other legal instruments for the promotion and protection of foreign investment between their members. Their experiences vary significantly, but undoubtedly demonstrate great dynamism. As will be seen later, these instruments contain numerous innovative provisions meant to strike a better balance between the rights, interests and expectations of the different stakeholders.
The Another EPA has been concluded on 15 July 2014 between the EU and SADC after ten years of negotiations.38 The agreement will replace the interim agreement concluded in 2009 -which never entered into force -between the European Communities and its Members, on the one side, and some SADC members (namely Botswana, Lesotho, Mozambique, Namibia and Swaziland) on the other side.39 The agreement provisionally applies since 10 October 2014 pending the ratification. The new agreement must be welcome since SADC members were able to overcome their divisions and deal with the EU as a single block, presumably with enhanced bargaining power and for the mutual benefit of all parties in terms of normative efficiency and predictability as well as of economic advantages and competitiveness. 40 On other occasions, negotiations intended to involve regional organizations were less productive. This was the case of the negotiations between the EU and the Central African States, which eventually resulted only in an interim EPA with Cameroon on 15 January 2009, which has been provisionally applied since 4 August 2014. 41 The EU has also concluded, with a couple of North African States, association agreements, which include a broad provision on the promotion and protection of investment.42 With a view to upgrade these agreements, on agreements are largely hortatory and impose only loose obligations upon the parties, primarily with regard to the establishment of consultative joint councils.
2.2.4
Sector Agreements (Energy ECOWAS) In 2003, ECOWAS members concluded an Energy Protocol deliberately inspired by the Energy Charter Treaty (ECT),49 which is described in the preamble as the 'leading internationally accepted basis for the promotion, cooperation, integration and development of energy investment projects and energy trade among sovereign nations' .50 Many of the substantive provisions contained in the Protocol reproduce or mirror those of the ECT.
From Globalism and Bilateralism Towards Regionalism
Keeping in mind the complex legal framework sketched in the previous Part and before delving into the contribution of African regional organizations to the development of the promotion and protection of foreign investment, it is worth discussing the rise and evolution of economic regional integration, with a special focus on Africa. To contextualise the discussion and appreciate the progressive development in Africa of regional investment treaties also in relation to the progressive development of legal instruments on trade relations, it must be recalled that the contemporary regulatory system of the global economy has been shaped in three different spaces, each furnished with distinct institutions and legal frameworks. The distinct regimes on trade, investment and monetary affairs do not always appear to be dictated by well-considered choices, but rather by incongruity of expertise. The distinctive development of legal regimes was not evident in the 1948 Havana Charter, drafted to establish the International Trade Organization (ITO). In addition to an extensive trade agenda, the ITO was authorized to 'formulate and promote the adoption of a general agreement or statement of principles regarding the conduct, practices and treatment of foreign investment.'52 The Havana Charter also called on member States 'to provide reasonable opportunities for investments acceptable to them and adequate security for existing and future investments, and to give due regard to the desirability of avoiding discrimination as between foreign investments.'53 The Charter 'faded away' after the US government declined to submit the agreement for approval to Congress. The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), as a leftover, survived as an instrument for trade liberalization.54 A different outcome might have resulted in a multilateral and probably more balanced approach towards the trade and investment agenda. This approach has currently been embraced in regional trade and investment agreements. In the Preamble of the SADC Protocol on Finance and Investment,55 for instance, the parties recognized 'the importance of the link between investment and trade, and the need for greater regional cooperation to enhance the attractiveness of the Region as an investment destination.'56 51 Accordingly, the requirement of 'fair and equitable treatment' , a well-developed concept in investment law, is not matched by similar treatment of international traders. Likewise, the regulatory framework of subsidies in WTO law is not matched by a similar commitment in international investment law. Yet, it is unclear why a subsidized investor is a lesser threat for fairness in competition than a subsidized trader. From the adoption of the GATT in 1947 and the establishment of the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 1995, the world trading system has developed into a comprehensive set of agreements and understandings. Uniformity was secured by the principle of 'single undertaking' , meaning that each adopted text is part of a whole and indivisible package and cannot be agreed separately. In other words, nothing is agreed until everything is agreed. As a result, all WTO Members57 are bound by identical texts without having the opportunity for individual members to opt out parts of the agreements. Critics argue that it is an illusion to think that Members with considerable diversity in their economic needs and bureaucratic capacity can ever agree on complex new provisions all at once.58 The so-called 'Single Undertaking' not only slows down multilateral liberalization but may even hamper any progress towards further liberalisation.59
In sharp contrast with the development of a uniform global trade framework, investment law has followed a completely different path, which has led to a complex network of treaties composed essentially of 2,329 BITs and 297 treaties with investment provisions (TIPs, using UNCTAD terminology) currently in force.60 Undoubtedly, bilateralism offers clear advantages by creating maximum flexibility to tailor to the special needs of each couple of States.61 This applies not only to the negotiation and conclusion of these treaties, but also to the adoption of the amendments that may be necessary to upgrade them in order to match the continuing evolution of the international legal order (especially as far as the protection of the environment, human and social rights are concerned). In an attempt to create order in the multitude of bilateral agreements, a multilateral treaty on investment was proposed both within the inner circle of developed States62 and in the broader environment of the WTO.63 However, the conclusion of a multilateral framework seems to be today ever more remote than in the past, inter alia, because of the increasing divergences between model BITs. As a result, States seem to be bound to live, at least in the near future, with the prevalent current bilateral legal framework and its undeniable complexity and shortcomings, which are often amplified by the inadequate level of consistency and predictability that unavoidably characterize current investment disputes.64
A combination of inflexibility of legal regimes and insurmountable opposing views between the developing and developed world has contributed to the discontents of the world trade and investment regime that has surfaced in recent years. The WTO is today perceived as being increasingly incapable to respond to a rapidly changing world. Another important advantage of regionalism is the opportunity to merge trade and investment disciplines into a single legal framework. This development responds to the need of commerce where value chains feature prominently. Goods are being processed -and value being added -in multiple countries that are part of the chain.70 Regional FTAs are an institutional response to the needs of value chain markets.
If economic factors driving States towards the establishment of FTAs, including enhanced efficiency and competiveness, improved access to markets and reduction of transaction costs, are evident, political considerations should not be neglected.71 Firstly, regionalism is a self-generating process creating more regionalism; countries that are left out of a regional arrangement tend either to join at a later stage or to search for their own FTA in order to escape from the marginalization syndrome. Secondly, regionalism creates security as it brings confidence and improves diplomacy within the region and beyond. Regional cooperation also enables parties to pursue convergence of trade, investment and monetary disciplines in a joint institutional framework and thereby create a market with common objectives, principles and a dispute settlement system that is sensitive to both economic and societal interests of that region. In addition, regional cooperation facilitates joined economic representation on the global arena where economically small or weak States have little negotiating power.
The advantages mentioned here do not necessarily mean that regionalism conflicts with trade disciplines as conceived by the WTO. Rather regionalism may be considered as complementary to the world trading system. The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) discerns converging and diverging effects of FTAs on the world trading system.72 FTAs may have a harmonizing effect by drawing on or replicating underlying WTO approaches or by helping to forge model approaches, possibly even for subsequent adoption in a WTO setting. In that sense, FTAs help to make advanced rules and reverse the fear that international agreements cause a race to the bottom. Accordingly, FTAs may set advanced technical standards or adopt understandings on societal values. Such standards and understandings may be used as evidence of State practice and be applied, through interpretation,73 in the world trading system in terms of social standards. On the other hand, the proliferation of FTAs may also be a source of divergence. FTAs in regions may distort the world trading system by setting deviating rules and standards which undermine the unified disciplines of the world trading system. In case a country has FTA partners, complex import rules apply depending on the origin of the product and this decreases transparency and uniformity. There may also be different rules within a single jurisdiction on dumping, subsidies or safeguard measures, depending whether the product origins from a FTA partner. Despite concerns about the proliferation of FTAs, they are a valid and effective response to the desire of trading partners to merge trade and investment regimes and to address a broader range of interests, such as the protection of the environment, competition and labour mobility. In various regions, deeper and broader economic integration has been a prime objective of trading partners. The African continent is a conspicuous example of such integration.
African Regionalism
The drive towards African economic integration demonstrates a strong aspiration to promote prosperity across the African continent, albeit not without surmounting considerable obstacles. The attraction of African regionalism can be explained by a number of reasons related to cultural and historical ties or political preferences. However, economic motives are likely to be the main reason. 54 African countries harbour relatively small economies with the multiplicity of national borders acting as barriers to intra-African trade. In 2010, 24 African countries had a population of less than 10 million, and 17 of less than 5 million. The gross domestic product (GDP) of 29 countries was less than USD 10 billion, and that of 18 countries less than USD 5 billion.79 Regional cooperation is a must rather than an option in order to reach a level of 'economies of scale' . There may also be some political motivations. The African continent may suffer from a 'marginalization syndrome' as it is excluded from trade arrangements that feature 75 Another likely reason for the rise of regionalism is the need to increase leverage of African States80 and to speak with a single voice when negotiating with other States and the international business community. Thus, by pooling diplomatic resources, developing countries in particular may achieve 'greater prominence in international relations and to negotiate agreements that would not be available if they have acted individually, and to assure election of their representatives to key positions in international organizations.'81
The African map reveals that most FTAs are truly regional in the sense that the States establishing the organizations are adjacent. The traditional distinction between Sahel-Saharan countries and sub Saharan countries does not show in the composition of FTAs. Two large FTAs connect countries throughout the continent: COMESA vertically connects a string of countries from Egypt to Zimbabwe. The Communauté des États Sahélo-sahariens (CEN-SAD) horizontally connects both Arab and sub-Saharan countries from Senegal to Sudan. The legacy of colonialism seems to have little influence on the composition of FTAs although the influence of former colonial powers may have some impact in the formation of FTAs.
African FTAs feature in a long term project of the AU that aims at fully integrating the African continent into a single economic bloc. The 1991 AU Treaty Establishing the African Economic Community (AEC) aims 'to establish, on a continental scale, a framework for the development, mobilisation and utilisation of the human and material resources of Africa in order to achieve a selfreliant development.'82 Under Article 6 of the Treaty, this ambitious project covers a time span of six stages until its completion in 2028. The plan consists initially in 'strengthening of existing regional economic communities …' and 'the conclusion of agreements aimed at harmonising and co-ordinating policies among existing and future sub-regional and regional economic The AU recognizes eight FTAs as constituent elements of the prospective AEC. FTAs are developing at a variable speed and take the shape of free trade areas, customs unions or common markets. The EAC, relatively small in terms of GDP, is considered the most advanced community having launched its customs union in 2010, which is to be followed by a common market.84 COMESA has adopted a customs union in June 2009.85 ECOWAS and SADC, which are currently established as FTAs, may in due time evolve into customs unions and common markets.86 The Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) is slightly lagging behind, whereas the Arab Maghreb Union (in French UMA), CEN-SAD and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) show limited levels of activity.87
The level of commitment to implement FTAs has been subject to criticism. In its Report on Africa, UNCTAD88 criticizes the laxity to remove tariff and non-tariff barriers which has stalled liberalization to a considerable extent. Apart from compliance problems, overlapping membership undermines effectiveness of FTAs. Out of 54 States, 42 are member of two or more FTAs, which each have established their own liberalization regime. Kenya is champion with its membership in four FTAs, including CEN-SAD, COMESA, EAC and IGAD. The overlapping membership may cause considerable complexities in tariff reduction schedules and implementing rules of origin and pose a heavy burden on the administration of customs. Overlapping membership may be explained by a lack of cooperation between FTAs and the desire of countries to gain better market access in more countries by joining two or more FTAs. Although multiple memberships may be acceptable in case of FTAs, it would be objectionable when one of the FTAs turns into a custom union. As the hallmark of a customs union is a commonly established common customs border (with commonly agreed tariffs and non-tariff import rules), it would be unacceptable for one of its members to join an FTA.90 Multiple memberships and shared loyalty towards FTAs may also cast doubt about the commitment for pursuing the objectives of a specific FTA.
ibid art 4(2)(a) and (b
In sum, there appears to be only five FTAs that make progress, albeit with different pace, towards integration as is anticipated by the AU. With the conclusion of a multilateral treaty on foreign investment remaining a rather remote possibility and the disaffection demonstrated by several States for BITs, investment treaties concluded within, by or between regional economic integration organizations have emerged as an increasingly important alternative -or a kind of 'third way' -to multilateralism and bilateralism. The phenomenon is not new, as regional agreements of this kind had already been concluded in the 1970s and 1980s.96 The novelties are the proliferation of these treaties and their increasing level of sophistication, both being particularly evident in Africa.
It must be immediately conceded that the conclusion of regional treaties may pose serious problems with regard to their overlapping application and their coordination, which ultimately may affect the legal certainty needed by both States and foreign investors. According to UNCTAD,
[r]ising regionalism in international investment policymaking presents a rare opportunity to rationalize the regime and create a more coherent, manageable and development-oriented set of investment policies. In reality, however, regionalism is moving in the opposite direction, effectively leading to a multiplication of treaty layers, making the network of international investment obligations even more complex and prone to overlap and inconsistency.97
Yet, the rise of regionalism calls for a balanced examination of the potential benefits and risks. The concern about the unintended consequences of the conclusion of regional treaties in terms of increased complexity, overlapping and inconsistency is well found, but any generalisation is hazardous -at least in Africa. This is due to the rather fragmented and extremely irregular development of BITs within the regional organisation with partial or complete African membership. This point may be illustrated by comparing the case of the regional investment treaties concluded within the League of Arab States and the OIC with those concluded within ECOWAS and SADC.
In the case of the OIC Investment Agreement,98 it appears that 20 BITs are currently in force just between Egypt and other members of the organisation.99 In the case of the League of Arab States investment agreement,100 it appears that 15 BITs are currently in force just between Egypt and other members of the organisation.101 The situation is further complicated by the simultaneous participation in both organisations of 13 States that have a BIT in force with Egypt. Moreover, neither of the regional treaties nor the relevant BITs contains any clause on possible inconsistencies between the applicable treaties, with the exception of the BIT between Egypt and Albania, according to which rules more favourable to foreign investors under other instruments would prevail over those of the BIT.102 The almost complete silence of these treaties on their coordination may be expected to make their interpretation and application rather problematic.
The situation is radically different in the case of the investment treaties concluded within SADC103 and ECOWAS.104 Only four BITs are currently in force between members of the first organization. While the SADC Protocol does not contain any provision on the coordination with other treaties, BITs concluded between its members generally give ways to other treaty provisions to the extent the latter are more favourable to foreign investor.105 With regard to the ECOWAS Supplementary Act, the BIT between Burkina Faso and Guinea is apparently the only one concluded between the members of the organisation. Importantly, the ECOWAS Supplementary Act imposes an obligation upon the parties to renegotiate within 24 months prior agreements containing provisions inconsistent with it as well as to ensure that future agreements are fully consistent with it. 106 Keeping in mind that the problems sketched above related to the proliferation of investment treaties and the overlapping parties to them affect in quite different proportions regional investment treaties, possible inconsistencies have to be settled by resorting to the applicable rules and principles governing treaties, most prominently the lex specialis and lex posterior principles. Yet, the concerned organisations and their members may consider the conclusion of subsequent agreements susceptible of settling any possible conflict in the application of the relevant treaties, presumably in favour of the provisions contained in the regional ones. The solution adopted in the COMESA Agreement (not in force) may serve as a model.107
The need to consider devices to solve possible conflicts between different treaties is even more evident when regional investment treaties expressly allow the parties to negotiate and continue to conclude BITs.108 Alternatively, the members of the regional treaties may accept to amend their BITs whenever this is necessary to avoid any inconsistency with the regional agreement, or even to progressively terminate their BITs in accordance with the terms of each of them. The problems related to the proliferation of investment treaties and their overlap at the bilateral and regional levels notwithstanding, several benefits and advantages can be associated to the conclusion of regional treaties. In the first place, investment treaties concluded within, by or between blocks of States may significantly simplify the normative landscape. Consider for instance the conclusion of the ECOWAS Supplementary Act or the investment agreement that may be concluded between the EU and ECOWAS within the EU's EPA initiative. The first treaty is the equivalent of 105 BITs concluded between the 15 members of the organization. The second would be the equivalent of 420 BITs concluded between the members of the two organizations (currently 28 and 15 respectively).
Moreover, the development of investment treaties by regions is not simply a matter of numerical equivalence to BITs, or expediency in the negotiations and conclusion of these treaties. The most important advantage is the creation of a single set of rules applicable to foreign investment within a block of States or between States belonging to two blocks. The uniformity of treaty rules expedites the process of facilitation and harmonization underway in Africa as well as the conclusion of other treaties that may enhance foreign investment, such as agreements for the avoidance of double taxation. From this perspective, Article 17 of the SADC Protocol on intra-regional and extra-regional agreements for the avoidance of double taxation is a good example.109 On an even more practical level, regional agreements are beneficial for both host States and foreign investors. For the former, the implementation of a single regional treaty may be expected to be less complicated, less problematic and ultimately less resource-consuming compared to the implementation of a bunch of similar, but probably not identical BITs. The exchange of best practices as well as the coordination of common policies amongst the concerned States could further contribute to facilitate progressively the flow and easier development of investment projects in different States, more predictability and stability, and lower costs. The combination of all these elements may be expected to improve the competitiveness of foreign investors operating within the region.
The advantages of a regional treaty are magnified when the investment projects concerns more States, such as larges projects related to infrastructures, communications or in the field of energy exploitation or transportation. In the case of a transnational highway or pipeline, for instance, foreign investors will enjoy the same treaty protection with regard to the whole project. The regional treaty will not only enhance the stability and predictability of the legal framework, but also facilitate the implementation of, and compliance with, the relevant treaty provisions, including, if applicable, those related to transparency, consultations as well as social and environmental impact assessment.
Furthermore, from the standpoint of African States, the negotiation of investment treaties collectively within regional organizations may be expected to minimize the risks related to the race amongst individual States to attract foreign capital, which may lure them into increasingly heavy concessions and unduly incisive limitations to their capacity to protect public interests. Needless to say, the bargaining power of regional organizations ultimately hinges on the cohesiveness and commitment of its members.
This Section has confirmed the dynamism of African regional organizations. Against the background of an ambitious Pan African project, several organizations have offered important contributions to the promotion and protection of foreign investment in the continent. Although the proliferation of regional investment treaties and their overlap with bilateral treaties may, at least in the short term increase complexity and uncertainty, regionalism seems to impose itself as an important and effective alternative to bilateralism, especially if adequate techniques are developed and applied to avoid and settle conflicts. Regional agreements may become the cornerstones or building blocks of a simpler and more coherent legal framework for foreign investment for the benefit of the different stakeholders from the standpoint of both efficiency and predictability.
Reconsidering the Promotion and Protection of Foreign Investment
After discussing the rise of regionalism in Africa, it is time to look at the content of regional investment treaties. The next three sections will focus on how regional treaties in Africa have addressed three main concerns raised in relation to the substantive treaty protection of foreign investment, namely the unbalanced character of investment treaties (Section 6.1), the allegedly undue restrictions on the policy space of host States (Section 6.2) and the lack of transparency and public scrutiny which often characterize investment projects (Section 6.3). Indeed, several substantive provisions contained in African regional treaties offer innovative responses to these concerns.
Balancing Rights and Obligations
The first concern is the manifestly unbalanced character of the overwhelming majority of investment treaties. These treaties systematically provide a set of guarantees and rights to foreign investors, while imposing obligations exclusively on host States.112 It is worth pointing out that the Preamble of the PanAfrican Investment Code indicates amongst its objectives the achievement 'of an overall balance of the rights and obligations amongst Member States and the investors.'113 The content of investment treaties, as any other treaties, is the result of deliberate choices made by the contracting parties; even in some cases negotiators may have little or no bargaining power, or poor understanding of the implications and potential consequences of these treaties.
The ECOWAS Supplementary Act is a paradigmatic attempt to redress the unbalanced character of investment treaties.114 In the first place, Chapter II on standards of treatment of foreign investors is balanced by Chapter III on investor obligations and duties. In addition to the general obligations to respect local legislation and regulations, Article 11 imposes upon foreign investors the duty to provide upon request from the host State the information concerning the putative investment 'for purposes of decision-making in relation to that investment or solely for statistical purposes.' Chapter III also imposes specific substantial obligations upon foreign investors, including the obligations to carry out an environmental and social impact assessment of a putative investment (Article 12), to refrain from getting involved into any corruption practice The ECOWAS Supplementary Act not only imposes upon foreign investors the substantive obligations mentioned above; it also attaches specific consequence in case of non-compliance. A dispute between the host State and a foreign investor on alleged violations of these obligations can be submitted by foreign investors to arbitration under Article 33, provided that an attempt to settle the dispute amicably has been unsuccessful. Furthermore, Article 18(1) introduces an innovative sanction for violations of the obligation on corruption imposed under Article 13. It establishes that a decision by a domestic court finding that an investor has breached Article 13 of the Supplementary Act would deprive the investor of the right to initiate any dispute settlement process established under the Supplementary Act. Interestingly, both the host State and the home State may raise this as an objection to jurisdiction in any dispute under the Supplementary Act (Article 18.1).
Article 29 of the ECOWAS Supplementary Act also imposes several obligations upon home States. Some of these obligations enhance the liability of foreign investors. They include a general obligation to ensure that the domestic legal systems and rules 'allow for, or do not prevent or unduly restrict, the bringing of court actions on their merits before domestic courts relating to the civil liability of investors for damages resulting from alleged acts or decisions made by investors in relation to their investments in the territory of other Member States.'115 The obligation paves the way to the institution of proceedings before the courts of the host State, a possibility which is often precluded by the forum non conveniens doctrine. What makes Article 29 even more interesting is the application in actions falling within the scope of Article 29 of the law of the host State.
Another obligation of host States is more specific and concerns corruption. Under Article 30(1), host States have to consider corruption, as precisely defined in sub-paragraphs (a) and (b), as a criminal offense and investigate, prosecute and punish with appropriate sanctions.
Finally, the investor's home State has an obligation to provide the potential host State, upon request, with the information necessary to the latter for the purpose 'to meet its obligations and perform its duties in relation to an investor or investment' under both the Supplementary Act and domestic law.116 This obligation complements the obligation incumbent upon the putative investor to provide the requested information to the host State. All of these normative novelties confirm that there is nothing inherent in the unbalanced character of traditional investment treaties. Quite the contrary, investment treaties can be upgraded relatively easily, most prominently by introducing obligations for foreign investors and even their home States, as well as by adequately defining the rights and duties of both the home and host States. In this regard, the record of African regional organisations reveals a much evident readiness of States to move towards more 'modern' investment treaties in the framework of regional organisation as opposed to intra-African BITs.117 Regional agreements not only impose obligations and grant rights to the various stakeholders, but also combine them in a systematic manner with a view to ensure both an adequate protection to foreign investors and an appropriate level of control over their activities by both host and home States. What also emerges from the practice of regional investment treaties in Africa is certain openness towards the experience of organisations outside Africa, with the ECOWAS Protocol on energy being a fine example of normative cross contamination.
6.2
Preserving Policy Space The content of African regional treaties must be appreciated also from the standpoint of the second concern mentioned above, namely risk that investment agreements could unduly limit the sovereignty of host States, curtail their regulatory powers and ultimately undermine their capacity to develop efficient policies, in particular in the field of the protection of the environment and public health. As pointed out in a recent document,
[o]ne common issue is the need to clarify the interaction between international investment instruments and domestic investment policy as well as policy in other areas -for e.g., sustainable development and environmental regulation. Governments must always be concerned about ensuring that there is sufficient policy space for them to engage in reconciling competing interests.118 It is undisputed that the host State exercises its legislative and regulatory powers with regard to all subjects -domestic or foreign -that are present within its jurisdiction. It is equally undisputed that foreign investors have to comply with local legislation and regulations. In this respect, it must be noted that some investment treaties impose amongst the general obligation incumbent upon foreign investors to comply with the law and regulations of the host State. For example, Article 11(1) and (2) of the ECOWAS Supplementary Act read:
1. Investors and Investments are subject to the laws and regulations of the host State. 2. Investors and investments must comply with the host State measures prescribing the formalities of establishing an investment, and accept host State jurisdiction with respect to the investment.
While the two paragraphs merely reiterate the obvious relationship between the host State and foreign investors, the reference to the 'acceptance' by the former of the jurisdiction of the latter seems redundant, if not misleading as it may suggest that the exercise of sovereign powers by the host State has somehow to be 'accepted' by foreign investors. The crucial issue is that the host State's legislative and regulatory powers must be exercised in conformity with its international obligations, including those stemming from investment treaties. A prominent purpose of these treaties is indeed to define the limits within which these powers have to be exercised. The exercise of legislative and regulatory powers requires the balancing of the interests of all public and private stakeholders. From this perspective it must be emphasised that 'the principle that the State's exercise of its sovereign powers within the framework of its police power may cause economic damage to those subject to its powers as administrator without entitling them to any compensation whatsoever is undisputable. '119 Appropriate clauses in investment treaties may ensure adequate regulatory space for administrative decision for the protection of the environment, public health, labour and human rights. This cannot, however, set aside the obligation to act diligently and transparently towards investors. Authorities cannot Article 14 of the SADC Protocol takes a different approach. It precludes any violation of the treaty in relation to measures adopted to ensure that foreign investments are sensitive to health, safety or environmental concerns. It reads Nothing in this Annex shall be construed as preventing a State Party from exercising its right to regulate in the public interest and to adopt, maintain or enforce any measure that it considers appropriate to ensure that investment activity is undertaken in a manner sensitive to health, safety or environmental concerns.122
The provision is self-judging, as clearly indicated by the text according to which it is for the host State to consider, in good faith, whether any given measure is appropriate to pursue this objective. Yet, the interpretation of the text may by more problematic when it comes to establish what is the precise meaning of the expression 'in a manner sensitive' to health, safety or environmental concerns.
The COMESA Agreement, in turn, contains a provision on general exceptions which provides that By allowing Member States to adopt and enforce the measures 'designed and applied to' -rather than 'necessary to' protect national security and public morals, human, animal or plant life or health, and the environment, Article 22 of the COMESA Common Investment Area does not require any balancing exercise. It rather focuses on why and how the relevant measures have been conceived and implemented, provided that they are consistent with the chapeau. Any possible doubt as to the latitude left to the host State is dissipated by the second paragraph, which clearly leaves to the host State the assessment, in good faith, on whether the given measures are appropriate for the purpose of sub-paragraphs 1(a)-(c).
Article 20 of the COMESA Investment Agreement further safeguards the regulatory powers of the host State in the context of the concept of indirect expropriation. It reads:
Consistent with the right of states to regulate and the customary international law principles on police powers, bona fide regulatory measures taken by a Member State that are designed and applied to protect or enhance legitimate public welfare objectives, such as public health, safety and the environment, shall not constitute an indirect expropriation under this Article.
The provision is similar to the one adopted in BITs or Model BITs.126 Yet, it significantly differs from those insofar as it excludes that bona fide regulatory measures could amount to indirect expropriation, instead of introducing a strong presumption (except in rare circumstances) against the qualification of non-discriminatory measures as indirect expropriation.
Two further developments related to the environment need to be mentioned. On the one hand, from the standpoint of the investor, a key issue is On the other hand, under Article 12(3) of the ECOWAS Supplementary Act investors and the host State authorities 'shall apply the precautionary principle to their environmental and social impact assessment.'130 The obligations of investors are completed by the duty to make the environmental and social impact assessment available to the local community.
In the same vein, Article 37(4) of the Pan-African Investment Code imposes upon both the home State and the investor the obligation to carry out an environmental impact assessment in relation to the planned investment, although it remains to be seen how the responsibility and costs to comply with this obligation will be allocated and coordinated between the States (without specifying whether the host State, the home State or both) and investors. The Code does not contain any reference to the precautionary principle, but provides that investors shall protect the environment and, when their activities cause damages to the environment, shall take reasonable restorative measures.
The SADC Protocol takes a more traditional approach. Reminiscent of the Preamble of the Treaty establishing the World Trade Organization, Article 12 (Optimal Use of Natural Resources) of the SADC Protocol proclaims that 'State Parties shall promote the use of their natural resources in a sustainable and an environmentally friendly manner.' Article 13 of the SADC Protocol, which must be read in conjunction with Article 14 on the right to regulate131 and is almost identical to Article 20 of the ECOWAS Supplementary Act, elaborates and substantiates this obligation. It reads:
State Parties recognise that it is inappropriate to encourage investment by relaxing domestic health, safety or environmental measures and agree not to waive or otherwise derogate from, international treaties they have ratified, or offer to waive or otherwise derogate from, such measures as an encouragement for the establishment, acquisition, expansion or retention in their territories, of an investment. The combination of the set of provisions just mentioned offers the host State adequate guarantees with regard to the acquisition of the relevant information and a minimum of public scrutiny. Yet, the ECOWAS Supplementary Act leaves much to be desired from the point of view of the active participation of the population and the groups that may be exposed to the consequences of specific investment project, including indigenous peoples.
Similarly to the conclusions reached in the previous two sections, it appears that properly drafted treaty provisions may greatly improve the level of transparency, participation and public scrutiny of investment projects. From this perspective too, African regional investment treaties contain innovative yet perfectible provisions. Including these provisions in investment treaties may be expected not only to enhance the legitimacy of foreign investment, but also to improve their economic performance.
Conclusions
Regional economic integration in Africa can be described as a complex and innovative exercise. Across the continent, 54 States cooperate in eight major FTAs with varying size, scope and effectiveness. The different FTAs feature in a long term project of the AU aiming at fully integrating the African continent into a single economic bloc.137 In this process of economic integration, the protection of foreign investment plays a key role. Several regional organizations have contributed and still contribute to improving and upgrading the protection of foreign investment in Africa. The institutional structures of these organizations are rather different and the legal instruments they have concluded rather heterogeneous. Yet, a few interesting features of the process of improving and upgrading the treaty protection of foreign investment are already evident and deserve attention. First, there is a clear trend towards the progressive abandonment of the traditional bilateral approach in favour of a legal framework built upon blocks of States. The regional approach may be expected to boost the flow of foreign investment to and across Africa by simplifying and harmonizing the normative environment, and by enhancing the effectiveness and mobility of multinational companies. Second, the instruments adopted by African regional organizations can be seen as remarkable attempts to answer to some of the main concerns that have been raised with regard to the current regulation of foreign investment, namely the need to rebalance the rights and obligations of various stakeholders as well as to better preserve the host State's policy space. This has led to the introduction, in some regional agreements, of obligations incumbent upon foreign investors and their home States. With regard to the consequence of violations of these obligations by foreign investors, it is worth noting that in the ECOWAS Supplementary Act, a breach of the duties related to corruption may deprive foreign investors of the access to international arbitration. For the time being, however, disputes concerning alleged violations of the obligations imposed upon foreign investors remain outside the scope of arbitral clauses.
Third, from the point of view of subject matters, the various investment instruments adopted by African regional organization offer several innovative elements, especially as far as the protection of the environment (including the obligation to go through an environmental impact assessment), social and human rights, transparency and information, corruption, economic development, and corporate responsibility are concerned. It can be safely concluded that African regional organizations and their member States have contributed in a significant and original way to upgrade investment treaties and bringing them in line with the rapid evolution and increasing complexity of international investment law. From this perspective, African regional organizations can be seen as an industrious normative laboratory on the promotion and legal protection of foreign investment.
